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Resettlement as climate change adaptation: what can be learned from state-led 
relocation in rural Africa and Asia?  
Abstract 
There is growing interest in helping people in developing countries cope with climate 
change by reframing population relocation as an adaptation strategy. However, there is also 
ongoing uncertainly surrounding what the advantages and disadvantages of resettling poor 
and vulnerable communities might be. This article helps address this knowledge gap by 
considering what might be learned from recent and ongoing state-led relocation 
programmes in rural Africa and Asia. It draws on a review of planned displacement and 
resettlement in eight countries, and six months’ experience researching a relocation 
programme in central Mozambique, to make three arguments: first, there is need to 
uncover long-standing governmental perceptions of rural populations and the ways in which 
these affect state-led responses to climate shocks and stresses; second, it is necessary to 
develop more sophisticated understanding of human choice, volition and self-determination 
during resettlement as adaptation; and third, greater attention should be paid to how 
development narratives are generated, transmitted and internalised during climate-induced 
relocations. Taking into account socioeconomic, political and historical realities in these 
ways will help to avoid situations in which present-day interventions to assist populations 
experiencing or threatened by climate displacement simply repeat or reinforce past 
injustices.  
Keywords  
Climate change adaptation; population resettlement; state-led relocation; Africa; Asia.   
1. Introduction   
One of the main ways in which climate change impacts will be felt by society over the next 
few decades is via an increased prevalence, frequency and intensity of weather-related 
extremes, such as flood and drought (Goodess, 2011). Populations living in rural areas, 
particularly those located within African and Asian countries, are especially vulnerable to 
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these alterations (IPCC, 2014). In these regions, one potential adaptation to climate change 
intervention that has appeared in recent years is the permanent resettlement of 
populations from areas exposed to shocks and stresses to less vulnerable locations within 
the same country (Bogardi and Warner, 2008). At the international level, a plethora of 
reports and guideline documents, such as the 2013 ‘Peninsula Principles on Climate 
Displacement within States’, have been produced, setting out what states and aid agencies 
should and should not do in these contexts (cf. Doberstein and Tadgell, 2015). And at the 
national level, population relocations in the context of climate stresses and shocks are 
ongoing or have recently occurred in countries as diverse as Papua New Guinea, 
Montserrat, Ethiopia, China and the Maldives (Foresight: Migration and Global 
Environmental Change, 2011).   
 
At first glance, there might be good reason to welcome these policy developments. An 
advantage of resettlement is that it can move a population further away from sources of 
harm (Correa, 2011). Resettlement can also bring development opportunities to people, 
bringing them closer to physical and social infrastructure, such as roads, schools and 
hospitals. However, there are also potential problems associated with resettling vulnerable 
populations. Recent examples from the natural hazards literature suggest that resettlement 
as a disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategy can hinder sustainable livelihoods formation 
amongst relocated people (Badri et al., 2006; DaCosta and Turner, 2007; De Silva and 
Yamao, 2007). Moreover, the extensive Development-Induced Displacement and 
Resettlement (DIDR) literature – which examines forced movement as a consequence of 
large-scale infrastructure projects – shows that involuntary relocation often leads to the 
impoverishment of those who are induced to move (Satiroglu and Choi, 2015). There is 
consequently ongoing uncertainty over what the potential opportunities and constraints of 
resettlement as a climate change adaptation measure might be.     
 
This article helps bridge this knowledge gap by critically exploring what might be learned 
from experiences of state-led relocation in rural areas of African and Asian countries. State-
led relocation is an important, albeit often underreported, phenomenon in developing 
countries. Primarily carried out as a ‘development’ measure in and of itself, it is 
characterised by the planned displacement and subsequent resettlement of people from 
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one of more places to other locations within a given country (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007). 
The numbers or people who have been relocated in this manner in the past few decades are 
poorly understood, although De Wet and Fox (2001) have put the figure at around 25 
million people in the latter half of the twentieth century in Africa alone, and projects of 
various sizes continue to this day. Recently, climate scholars and policymakers have begun 
to explore the policy and practice links between different forms of resettlement, most 
notably in relation to DIDR (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015) and relocation resulting from 
colonial policies (McAdam, 2014). Moreover, the importance of placing contemporary 
debates about climate resettlement within longer-term historical and intellectual 
perspectives has also been stressed (McAdam, 2015a). Yet there is a paucity of work 
examining potential connections between resettlement as adaptation and planned, state-
led relocations.    
  
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section surveys the climate change 
literature to draw together three key principles of resettlement as adaptation. Then, in 
section 3, the main issues concerning state-led relocation that arise in relation to these 
principles are explored via a review of academic literature pertaining to eight countries in 
Africa and Asia characterised by a long history of planned displacement and resettlement 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘country review’). In carrying out this review, the primary aim 
was not to provide a detailed historical and socio-political analysis of each country but 
rather to draw out the main characteristics of relocation in the different locations that were 
most significant to the three key principles referred to above. Section 4 draws on six 
months’ experience conducting research in central Mozambique between 2011 and 2014 to 
reflect on how these issues have played out on the ground and what the operational 
implications for aid agencies planning interventions might be. During this period, a series of 
interviews, observations and associated activities was conducted over the course of four 
separate fieldtrips. The research examined resettlement as a response to flooding in and 
alongside the Zambezi River valley, an intervention that has been widely portrayed by 
government and aid agencies operating in the region as a climate change adaptation or 




The conclusion is provided in section 5. The article demonstrates that the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of resettlement as adaptation need to be considered in the 
context of the broader socioeconomic and political narratives in which they operate, 
especially in national settings in which often complex displacement and relocation processes 
have helped define state-rural relations over many years. In addition, the presence of these 
historical and structural influences suggests that a more advanced understanding of what 
induces poor and vulnerable populations to relocate on a voluntary basis, and how 
relocation schemes are promoted and legitimised during and after planned resettlement, is 
required. In the text that follows, the term ‘resettlement’ is generally used to refer to 
human movement in the context of climate change and ‘relocation’ is employed in relation 
to state-led programmes.     
2. Principles of resettlement as adaptation  
In this section, three key principles of resettlement as adaptation are identified, drawn from 
a review of the academic and grey literature on climate change and population relocation. 
The documents examined range from articles that were primarily motivated by 
consideration of philosophical and ethical principles (e.g. see Johnson, 2012) to those that 
were much more practical in their approach, designed to produce a set of workable 
resettlement guidelines (e.g. see Ferris, 2017). The three principles outlined below were 
judged to be the most significant across all of the documents. These principles form the 
foundation on which the analysis in the rest of the article is based.   
 
The first key principle is that resettlement as adaptation should only be undertaken as a last 
resort and when it is completely necessary. Barnett and O’Niell (2012) emphasise this in 
their article concerning small-island developing states (SIDS) and resettlement. They argue 
that, even though climate change represents a major challenge for low-lying countries at 
risk of inundation, there is ongoing uncertainty over how climate change effects will play 
out for different groups of people in different places, and that its impacts might not be 
significantly felt for decades. Thus, relying on resettlement as a response measure can 
foreclose other, less drastic adaptation options, such as the construction of sea walls or the 
installation of early warning systems which, by themselves, can do much to avoid climate 
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change impacts (Arnall and Kothari, 2015). The ‘last resort’ principle can also help protect 
people from those in power who might “use the excuse of reducing community exposure to 
climate change in order to conduct forced migrations for political or economic gain” 
(Barnett and Webber, 2009;27). This protection will become more and more significant as 
governments and other interested parties, informed by increasingly sophisticated global 
circulation models and impact assessments, aim to “secure the present by acting in advance 
of the future” (Anderson, 2010;777) by moving people from areas exposed to shocks and 
stresses to less vulnerable locations within the same country in a proactive manner. This will 
particularly be the case in which funding requests are being considered from countries with 
autocratic governments or with a record of human rights abuses to proactively relocate 
people who, it is claimed, are at risk of climate displacement (Biermann and Boas, 2010).    
  
Second, it is widely acknowledged that resettlement as adaptation should be voluntary in 
nature. Voluntary resettlement, according to Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington (2007), 
“allows the affected people to decide whether they want to stay behind or take part in the 
resettlement process, which might offer them new opportunities” (p.2184). It thus allows 
potential resettlers to exercise choice in whether they leave or not. This contrasts with 
involuntary resettlement, in which, using the definition of coercion provided by Wood 
(2014), resettlers move when they do not choose to do so or, when they choose to move, 
they do so because they have no acceptable alternative. One the one hand, voluntariness 
can be viewed as a good in itself, as something necessary in order to fulfil the principles of 
what constitutes climate justice (Lipset, 2013). On the other hand, moving populations in a 
voluntary manner is often seen in the climate change literature, such as in Perry and Lindell 
(1997), as producing a range of consequentialist benefits for populations. This is because 
gaining the free and informed consent of affected communities in relation to “whether or 
not they decide to relocate, the terms on which they are expected to move, and the 
conditions under which they are accepted and integrated into new societies” (Johnson, 
2012;313) greatly influences the longer term success of such schemes, with resettlement 
that is involuntary nearly always failing (McAdam, 2015b). There are a number of reasons 
why resettlement outcomes are usually better when relocation is undertaken in a voluntary 
manner. Voluntary resettlement helps to avoid the problems associated with ‘bottom-up’ 
resistance amongst relocatees, which can involve both visible and direct challenges to state 
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authorities (Oliver-Smith, 1991), or more nuanced mechanisms such as those associated 
with ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 1985). In addition, drawing on relocatees’ views and 
ideas in an inclusive manner can lead to better-designed programmes which more 
effectively meet their needs and expectations (Maldonado et al., 2013). These processes 
should involve all socioeconomic groups, including those which normally do not have access 
to decision-making fora (Weerasinghe, 2014).   
 
The third principle is that resettlement as adaptation should be developmental. This means 
that, as an absolute minimum, resettlers should be no worse off as a result of relocation, 
and that, ideally, their long term wellbeing in their new settlements is improved. In the field 
of DIDR, policies aimed at improving relocatee wellbeing have focussed on the restoration 
of people’s livelihoods following resettlement. The best known framework for managing this 
process is the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model for resettling displaced 
populations (Cernea, 1997). This identifies key impoverishment processes in displacement 
and suggests tackling these through explicit restoration strategies backed up by adequate 
financing during resettlement. The considerable experience that has built up in use of the 
IRR over the past two decades suggests that it can be usefully applied to cases of 
resettlement as adaptation. However, major challenges remain in the model’s transfer in 
this way. For one thing, effective livelihoods restoration normally requires considerable 
resources to achieve, and this will certainly be the case for the millions of people threatened 
by climate displacement in Africa and Asia where the costs of resettling, according to 
Biermann and Boas (2010), are “likely to surpass all financial transfers under multilateral 
and bilateral development cooperation schemes” (p.82). In addition, the operational 
complexities of resettlement processes – both in terms of developing coherent policy (Rew 
et al., 2006) and achieving effective implementation on the ground (Koenig, 2005) – mean 
that, even if adequate finance is made available, developmental relocations can be difficult 
to achieve in practice.   
3. Significant issues in state-led relocation  
With the three principles outlined in section 3 in mind, it is now possible to identify more 
precisely which issues of state-led relocation are particularly relevant to resettlement as 
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adaptation. The country review, from which these issues are drawn, concerned Egypt 
(Adriansen, 2009), Ethiopia (Woldemeskel, 1989), Rwanda (Leeuwen, 2001), Tanzania (Lal, 
2012), Zambia (Von Oppen, 2006), China (Rogers and Xue, 2015), Laos (Baird and 
Shoemaker, 2007) and Vietnam (Anh, 2006). Given the general lack of information about 
state-led relocation in the public domain, these countries were chosen based on the degree 
of data accessible, with the countries offering the most information about resettlement 
being prioritised.  
 
The relocation programmes examined vary in terms of their timeframe, with some projects 
dating back to the 1950s, as in Zambia, and others being implemented far more recently, as 
in Rwanda. They also vary in terms of the numbers of people moved, from 1.5 million in 
Ethiopia, to the tens of thousands in Tanzania. In other resettlement schemes, such as 
Vietnam’s, the numbers of people moved is unknown, although figures are likely to be in the 
hundreds of thousands. The relocation programmes also share a number of important 
characteristics. All of the schemes examined contain a significant element of socioeconomic 
reorganisation, with land typically being the main asset redistributed. They also all contain a 
central collectivisation or ‘villagisation’ component whereby rural inhabitants living in 
dispersed forms of settlement, such as in dwellings that are spaced a few kilometres apart, 
are reordered into planned communities with houses that are arranged in neat, orderly 
rows and are spaced much more closely together.  
 
Thus, bringing together the literature on resettlement as adaptation and state-led 
relocation, in the context of the first principle, climate resettlement as a last resort, it might 
be instructive to examine discussions in the state-led literature concerning government 
preference for population relocation as a form of rural ‘development’. When considering 
the need to make resettlement as adaptation voluntary, it could be fruitful to explore recent 
debates concerning the ‘grey area’ between voluntary and involuntary relocation. And in 
the context of making resettlement as adaptation developmental, it could be pertinent to 
refer to studies exploring how state-led relocation programmes are legitimised, even in 
conditions in which resettlers are potentially impoverished as a result of their movement. In 




3.1 Government preference for population relocation 
As stated in the previous section, an important principle of resettlement as adaptation is 
that it should only be undertaken as a measure of last resort. This contrasts, however, with 
the country review which suggests that resettlement has a long history of readily emerging 
as a government-based ‘solution’ to problems of poverty, vulnerability and marginalisation 
amongst rural populations in Africa and Asia. To illustrate, de Wet (2012) has shown that 
“villagization projects have been imposed in the rural areas of Africa by successive 
governments, whether in a colonial or independent context, capitalist or socialist context, 
throughout the 20th century” (p.396). In this region, a preference for relocation in many 
countries has taken on a “self-legitimising momentum” of its own (Von Oppen, 2006;59) 
whereby successive relocation interventions implemented by the state derive directly from 
each another, “both intellectually and in terms of considerations such as state perceptions 
of development and the need for intervention in rural areas” (De Wet, 2012;397). And 
similarly in southeast Asia, de Koninck and Dery (1997) have explored how agricultural 
expansion has long-acted as a tool of planned population redistribution in countries such as 
the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand since the early 1900s.  
 
There are a number of potential reasons evident in the country review for why governments 
often have a preference for state-led relocation. One reason relates to the fact that a single 
relocation scheme often serves multiple objectives of the state. For example, Baird and 
Shoemaker (2007) describe how, in Laos, the government’s long-running resettlement 
programme has been motivated by five different objectives: opium eradication, security 
concerns, facilitating access and service delivery, cultural integration and nation building, 
and eradication or reduction of shifting agriculture. The presence of multiple objectives 
means that different claims about the scheme can be directed at different audiences, which 
can act to increase the overall acceptability of the programme. Moreover, many 
resettlement schemes, such as those in Tanzania and Ethiopia, have a number of declared 
aims, which focus on rural development and poverty reduction, and a set of underlying 
aims, which relate to government interests in securing control over rural populations 
(Leeuwen, 2001). Indeed, as Devereux et al. (2005) have observed in Ethiopia, the existence 
of agricultural stagnation in rural areas has been used as an excuse by government to 
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implement resettlement for a wide range of political reasons, rather than resettlement 
being implemented as a means to address rural poverty per se.  
 
The presence of multiple objectives also means that resettlement is relatively easy for 
governments to reinvent and adapt to new contexts. Thus, in the country review, there is 
evidence of different objectives shifting in emphasis over time, with new ones emerging in 
response to broader socioeconomic, political and technological shifts and regime changes. 
For example, in Rwanda, the country’s relocation of families displaced by genocide was 
originally aimed at securing rural order, stimulating the emergence of alternative income 
sources, and streamlining access to social services. More recently, however, the programme 
has evolved to incorporate climate change adaptation objectives (Gebauer and 
Doevenspeck, 2014). And similarly in China, Rogers and Xue (2015) have shown that pre-
existing state-led relocation schemes designed to alleviate poverty and prevent 
environmental degradation are being repackaged as climate change adaptation measures, 
earmarked in the country’s National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy as a means of 
moving people out of areas considered to be vulnerable to climate disasters. In both Africa 
and Asia then, preference for population relocation potentially complicates the political 
challenges involved in implementing resettlement as adaptation on a ‘last resort’ basis.  
3.2 The ‘grey area’ between voluntary and involuntary relocation  
Section 2 outlined the resettlement as adaptation principle that relocation should be 
voluntary in nature. However, scholars of forced migration have questioned the usefulness 
of the voluntary-involuntary distinction in the context of relocation (de Wet, 2008; Evrard 
and Goudineau, 2004; Fogel, 1999; Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington, 2007), with Wilmsen 
and Wang (2014) describing it as a “false dichotomy” (p.612). Rather, what these studies 
and country review show is that many programmes which claim to be voluntary in fact 
operate within a ‘grey area’ between voluntariness and involuntariness in which particular 
individuals and groups can be subject to significant coercive or manipulative forces, what 
Gebre (2002) has referred to as ‘induced’ or ‘compulsory’ volunteerism. This occurred in 
Laos, for example, where Baird and Shoemaker (2007) found that resettlement usually 
began with government officials promoting the idea of resettlement as something beneficial 
for families and communities, whilst also making it clear that not resettling was not an 
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option. And similarly, in Ethiopia, Hammond (2008) reported how resettlers stated that they 
had ‘volunteered’ or ‘chosen’ to move to their new villages, but only in the context of 
“anticipated dire consequences” if they had not done so (p.526).  
  
In addition to induced or compulsory volunteerism, the country review revealed a dynamic 
element to the balance of voluntary and involuntary measures as programmes progress. 
Typically, the initial stages of a state-led relocation scheme are characterised by relatively 
high levels of voluntariness. However, as they advance, involuntary measures are inevitably 
introduced, or become severer, in order to see programme objectives through. For example, 
Leeuwen (2001), in his review of villagisation policies in East Africa, examined how 
resettlement authorities in Tanzania, Mozambique and Ethiopia commonly resorted to force 
when their programmes did not follow the pace originally foreseen. In addition, Lal (2012) 
reported how, in Tanzania in the 1960s, local officials would commonly travel through the 
countryside, encouraging rural people to live together; however, later on in the 1970s, 
“Youth League and People’s Militia members…forcefully resettled those who had initially 
refused to move, or who were living in small villages, into large settlements” (p.220).  
 
The reasons for the mix of voluntary and involuntary-based inducements are complex. 
Sometimes, a limited degree of voluntary engagement within a relocation programme 
enables government and aid agencies to label the operation as entirely voluntary, and 
hence less a matter of concern, even if closer inspection reveals this not to be the case. 
However, even in resettlement schemes in which incentives for populations to move are 
well-implemented, moving people in a purely voluntary fashion can still be difficult to 
achieve. One reason for this is that the very high levels of uncertainty which typically 
surround the advantages and disadvantages of relocating mean that resisting resettlement 
can appear to be the only feasible option for some communities (see Dwivedi, 1999). 
Another reason is that, due to social differentiation (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999), individuals 
and groups within the same community are likely to adopt a wide variety of positions and 
strategies with regard to a proposed relocation scheme. This means that there will 
inevitably be some sections of communities which remain resistant to resettlement, 
regardless of the incentives that are offered to them (Koenig, 2005). Such a scenario is 
especially likely in instances in which negative prior experiences of past relocation schemes 
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have resulted in a legacy of distrust and suspicion of governmental authorities. For example, 
Maldonado et al. (2013) have shown how, for indigenous Alaskan communities, “climate-
induced migration cannot be separated from the sensitive history of government-mandated 
tribal relocations that occurred throughout the United States from the late 1700s well into 
the 20th century” (p.603). In circumstances such as these, relocation agents might feel that 
they have little choice but to compel certain groups to relocate through the imposition of 
involuntary measures. Complications such as these therefore question the feasibility of 
achieving resettlement as adaptation on a purely voluntary basis.  
3.3 The mobilisation of legitimising narratives  
Section 2 stated that the outcomes of resettlement as adaptation should be developmental 
in nature, with most focus by policymakers to date on the restoration and enhancement of 
relocatee’s livelihoods following their movement. However, the country review shows that 
resettlement outcomes are not just determined by the economic conditions of local 
populations. In addition to these elements, there can be important processes of legitimation 
at play, and these can have a major influence on how the outcomes of resettlement are 
viewed by those who are induced to move. In this article, legitimation, a theme long-studied 
in the political sciences (Gordon, 2009), is understood as a process through which the 
exercise of power by the powerful in society is justified (Swartz, 1997). According to 
Engelstad (2009), in contrast to economic considerations, legitimacy is inherently a cultural 
phenomenon, “expressed by signs and arguments, referring to religious or political 
doctrines, popularised through slogans, publicised through posters, public decorations and 
monuments” (p.213). Strengthening the regime of a resettlement programme via culturally-
based legitimising strategies is often an important, albeit overlooked, aspect of relocation. 
This is particularly the case given that inducing people to move to, and remain in, 
resettlement areas on the basis of imposition of economic rewards, inducements and 
punishments alone can be insufficient (cf. Evrard and Goudineau, 2004).  
  
Legitimation processes in state-led relocation schemes can take numerous forms and 
produce many effects. To illustrate, in Tanzania, the multiple villagisation projects that have 
occurred since the 1950s have commonly been accompanied by messages concerning 
‘modernisation’ (Scott, 1998), ‘destiny’ (Schneider, 2007) and ‘self-reliance’ (Lal, 2012). 
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Development narratives (Wolmer et al., 2006) such as these can be so powerful that 
relocated people might consent to, or even appear to support, resettlement in spite of it 
leading to very poor living conditions. For example, in Laos, Jacka (2008) has shown how the 
country’s programme of relocating farmers from high to lowland areas tapped into deeply-
held aspirations concerning modernisation and poverty reduction. Once relocatees arrived 
at their new homesteads their expectations were jarred as they encountered inadequate 
government services and lowered incomes. When faced with this reality, however, the 
“experimental and aspiration-oriented mode of engaging with the state” took prominence, 
with the result that “settlers judged the lack of government services and charity to be the 
cause of the horrific conditions of resettlement villages, rather than resettlement itself” 
(p.499). This situation is similar to the one reported by Adriansen (2009), who described 
how, in Egypt, the reframing by the government of the country’s long-running relocation 
scheme as a national project to ‘green the desert’ that “everybody should feel obliged to 
participate in” (p.669) increased acceptability of the scheme amongst the resettler 
population. This occurred in spite of the fact that some groups faced difficulties in building a 
sense of belonging to their new villages and experienced reduced access to government 
services. Processes such as these can cause some resettlers to ‘cling on’ to their designated 
resettlement sites in the hope of accessing future opportunities in spite of the poor living 
conditions into which they have been transferred.  
 
In other cases, relocation managers rely on the mobilisation of security-related narratives 
that promise protection of certain groups in the face of external threats. This is particularly 
applicable to the context of climate displacement in which repeated weather-related 
extremes, such as floods, can constitute serious risks to people’s safety and livelihoods. In 
some countries, disasters have been used by governments as a way of shoring up political 
support for, and justifying, the emergence of unpopular social policies. This has been 
reported by Kothari (2014) in the Maldives, for example, in response to the ‘sinking islands’ 
discourse. Thus, the occurrence of weather-related shocks and stresses can contribute to 
the legitimation, and hence re-emergence, of previously discredited resettlement 
programmes. These narratives can be aimed at populations living in rural areas that have 
become viewed as ‘dangerous’ or ‘risky’ by national authorities, regardless of what the 
economic consequences for relocated people might be.   
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4. Resettlement as adaptation and state-led relocation in Mozambique  
Following the identification of three key principles of resettlement as adaptation and the 
corresponding issues concerning state-led relocation that they raise, this article now turns 
to the case of Mozambique. The research on flooding and resettlement took place in three 
districts, Caia, Tambara and Morrumbala, in the central region of the country. In this area, a 
series of cyclones in 2007 and 2008 led to large-scale flooding and the displacement of tens 
of thousands of small-scale farmers out of the Zambezi River valley (the zona baixa). Using 
funding assistance provided by donors, these populations were subsequently relocated by 
provincial and district-level governmental authorities from their dispersed homesteads 
located in the floodplain to resettlement villages located in the high area (zona alta) a few 
kilometres away but in a different, dryer agro-ecological zone. Many inhabitants of 
resettlement villages have subsequently received donor-assisted livelihoods support, such 
as income diversification projects designed to decrease farmers’ reliance on crop production 
in the more fertile zona baixa.  
 
As stated in section 1, a total of six months was spent in central Mozambique between 2011 
and 2014. All work was carried out subject to approval by the standard ethical research 
procedures established at the author’s home institute, and in Mozambique established 
procedures were followed at provincial, district and village levels in order to gain access to 
communities. A total of 83 semi-structured group- and individual-based interviews on the 
topics of livelihoods, small-scale farming, floods and relocation were held with relocatees, 
government officials, and representatives from national and international aid agencies. In 
addition, numerous informal interactions and observations on these themes were made 
through day-to-day interactions with these actors, and which were written up in a field diary 
for later recall (Punch, 2012). Particularly useful in this respect was the opportunity to 
participate in and observe a total of seven official and numerous unofficial village meetings 
during which the topic of relocation was discussed at length. Finally, a total of 17 reports 
and documents produced by district-, provincial- and national-level government and aid 
agencies was collected and reviewed. The observations and secondary data proved to be 
particularly helpful in triangulating what respondents had stating during interviews (Mason, 




Using the Mozambique example, the primary aim is, through a process of critical reflection, 
to bring the author’s experiences in the region to bear on the resettlement as adaptation 
challenge. It does this by considering, in turn, how the three issues identified in section 3 
played out on the ground. In this way, the Mozambican case provides a clear and 
contemporary example of the opportunities and difficulties that this form of intervention 
brings.  
4.1 Climate resettlement as a measure of last resort 
Section 4.1 showed how government preference for state-led relocation in many developing 
countries could lead to the ‘last resort’ principle being compromised following the 
occurrence of weather-related shocks and stresses. In Mozambique, this occurred following 
the 2007 floods when national and provincial-level government, via the National Institute of 
Disaster Management (Instituto Nacional de Gestão das Calamidades; INGC), quickly 
resettled thousands of small-scale farming households in the weeks and months after the 
initial inundation had occurred.   
 
Why did the relocation scheme occur at this rapid pace? And why did it take place in the 
absence of evidence concerning the advantages and disadvantages to households of 
transferring them to new, high area settlements, when other adaptation measures, such as 
early warning systems, might have been more appropriate? On the one hand there was the 
need for the Mozambican government to ‘capture’ the large quantities of humanitarian aid 
which entered the country following the floods by channelling it towards an expensive 
resettlement programme. On the other hand, in Mozambique there is a long history of 
resettlement of small-scale farmers which stretches back to the colonial era, and which set 
the conditions for the re-emergence of relocation following the 2007 floods (Artur and 
Hilhorst, 2014). The objectives which have motivated the implementation of such schemes 
during and since the colonial era are numerous and have allowed government authorities to 
reinvent and adapt state-led relocation to different political circumstances over time. To 
illustrate, during colonialisation, the Portuguese authorities commonly resettled small-scale 
farmers into villages as collectivised populations were easier to organise for forced labour 
and tax-raising purposes (O'Laughlin, 2002). Following independence in 1975, and during 
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the country’s civil war, resettlement of this group continued, although the prime 
motivations switched from an economic rational to a security-based one, as collectivised 
populations were viewed as easier to control and less likely to come under the influence of 
the opposition party, Renamo. Similarly, following the 2007-2008 floods, displaced 
populations became exposed to a variety of external agendas concerning regional economic 
development and protection from political rivals, thus unconnected to climate change, but 
which nevertheless played a major role in shaping the processes and outcomes of relocation 
for affected people (Arnall, 2014).  
 
The Mozambican case raises questions of how governments and aid agencies can know 
when the point of ‘last resort’ has been reached, and highlights the difficulties of objectively 
assessing when the risks of not acting (thus exposing populations to the risks of climate 
change-related loss and damage) exceed those of taking action (thus exposing populations 
to the risks posed by badly planned and implemented resettlement). One way to address 
this problem is via the implementation of appropriate vulnerability and risk assessment 
activities, of which international aid agencies have considerable expertise. However, what 
the country review and Mozambican example highlight is that there might be a high degree 
of institutional complexity concerning relocation already present at national and sub-
national levels which also requires examination. These institutional contexts might not be 
formally established, but rather embedded within the deeper fabrics of national and 
provincial governmental agencies, and reflect historically-grounded relations between urban 
centres, where elites are based, and rural, ‘marginal’ areas. In cases where resettlement as 
adaptation is being contemplated by aid agencies and governments, it will be necessary to 
uncover what these institutional dispositions are, and how they might affect the design and 
implementation of the relocation programme.  
4.2 Making climate resettlement voluntary  
Section 3.2 highlighted the difficulties of implementing relocation programmes on a 
voluntary basis due to the uncertainties faced by resettlers, and the differing needs, 
interests and experiences of individuals and groups within communities. In central 
Mozambique, it was widely understood that the country’s resettlement programme 
following the 2007 floods was voluntary in nature. These claims helped to shore up support 
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for the programme and increased its acceptability to donors, many of whom, whilst not 
directly involved in the relocation of farmers, contributed to the construction of, and 
provision of services to, resettlement villages as they were being established. However, 
interviews and discussions with relocatees themselves revealed an overriding reluctance 
amongst many people to relocate to the zona alta. Small-scale farmers transferred to the 
high area face an uncertain future in a new, unfamiliar environment that is prone to 
drought. What’s more, in the central region of Mozambique, population relocation out of 
floodplains is commonly associated by local communities with historical processes of forced 
collectivisation related to conflict prevention and population control during the country’s 
civil war of the 1980s. These factors meant that a mixture of voluntary and involuntary 
strategies were needed by government-based authorities in order to see the relocation 
programme through. In some cases, small-scale farmers, whilst not physically forced out of 
the Zambezi floodplain, were ordered to leave by INGC personnel and UNAPROC, the 
government agency’s military-based wing. At the same time, the promise of new lifestyles in 
the high area – as exemplified by the provision of modern houses constructed from 
concrete and corrugated iron rather than traditional materials – undoubtedly acted as a 
draw for some groups.  
 
The Mozambican example raises the questions of on what basis a resettlement as 
adaptation scheme can be labelled as ‘voluntary’, and how this can be achieved in the 
context of socioeconomic diversity amongst relocatees. Clearly, as set out above, the simple 
‘voluntary-involuntary’ framework, although relatively intuitive, fails to adequately capture 
the complexity of the processes involved in state-relocation, and this should also be 
acknowledged in relation to resettlement as adaptation. Instead, new frameworks that take 
into consideration the variety of ways in which relocation managers exert influence over 
different groups of resettlers during the implementation of resettlement as adaptation 
projects need to be developed. For example, whilst most concern in resettlement projects 
usually arises over the coercive expulsion of resettlers from their homes, it is also possible 
that resettlers are widely exposed to a less well-studied but arguably more pervasive form 
of influence, that of manipulation. This, according to Wood (2014), does not remove 
people’s options completely, as coercion does, but instead shapes the choices that are 
available to them in ways that are morally problematic, through mechanisms such as 
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deception, pressure to acquiesce or playing upon people’s emotions. Consideration of these 
concepts is likely be particularly important in contexts in which disaster narratives related to 
ongoing climate shocks and stresses, such as reoccurring floods, are creating pressures to 
act by governments and aid agencies (Furedi, 2007).   
4.3 Achieving developmental climate resettlement   
As highlighted in section 3, a widely accepted principle of resettlement as adaptation is that 
it is developmental, mainly through ensuring that the livelihoods of people being moved are 
restored and enhanced post-relocation. In central Mozambique, a mixed picture emerged 
for populations that had been relocated from the floodplain of the Lower Zambezi river to 
the zona alta. In some areas, where the distances moved were relatively small and farmers 
had received high levels of external assistance in their new villages, resettlement had 
relatively beneficial livelihood outcomes for relocatees. In other regions, however, farming 
communities were clearly worse off post-relocation. This was due to their new villages being 
long distances from their farms in the zona baixa and the low levels of post-resettlement 
assistance that they received. In general, these problems were not attributable to an overall 
lack of financial resources, given the large quantities of money that had flowed into the 
country in the weeks and months following the 2007 floods. Rather, they were related to 
poor planning and implementation of the national resettlement scheme by government-
based authorities1.     
 
In addition to the economic aspects of resettlement, the country review emphasises the 
importance of the processes of legitimation that might be at play, and what these mean for 
how relocation outcomes are understood. In areas of central Mozambique where 
resettlement had lowered farmers’ livelihood prospects, rates of abandonment in favour of 
permanent return to the low area were relatively high, at between 20-30 percent of all 
households per village. However, many other families were observed to be ‘hanging in’ 
resettlement areas in spite of being worse off economically. This observation can be 
attributed to the fact that resettlement sites were commonly viewed by resettlement 
authorities and relocatees alike as zones of ‘modernity’: localised expressions of national 
                                                          
1 For detailed exploration of the benefits and losses experienced by small-scale farmers moving from the zona 
baixa to the zona alta in Mozambique, see Arnall (2014) and Artur and Hilhorst (2014).   
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‘progress’, regardless of the economic realities of securing a livelihood within them. This is 
reflected by the aesthetic qualities of resettlement villages which, in contrast to the 
seemingly haphazard nature of dispersed ‘traditional’ settlements, are ordered and neatly 
arranged, deliberately positioned alongside main roads where passers-by can easily view 
them. In addition, resettlement sites symbolise the supposed ability of the state to provide 
small-scale farmers with security from external threats, not just from floods, but also from 
the political opposition, Renamo, which is still active and commands a degree of local 
popular support. In this way, the complexities of the resettlement process, including its 
cultural dimensions, had the effect of creating a ‘mystifying discourse’ (Navarro, 2006) 
amongst resettlers over the impacts of their removal from the zona baixa in which resettlers 
believed that their ‘time’ for development would come if they waited patiently in the high 
area.    
 
The implications of taking seriously the issues associated with the cultural dimensions of 
resettlement as adaptation are potentially considerable. During relocation programmes, it is 
often assumed that resettlers are ‘rational’ and primarily act in their own economic 
interests. Thus, if rewards, incentives and penalties are lined up by resettlement managers 
in an optimal manner, then people will respond accordingly by moving to new resettlement 
sites as intended. However, what the example from Mozambican highlights is that, during 
resettlement as adaptation, there is the potential for broader legitimising narratives of 
relocation that go beyond immediate concerns of material gain and loss to have important 
bearings on development outcomes for people. These culturally-rooted narratives 
concerning modernisation and securitisation might compel poor and vulnerable groups to 
move for reasons that eclipse the shifting material-based cost-benefit landscapes in which 
they are located and on which aid agencies traditionally focus. There is need, therefore, for 
greater understanding of how messages concerning development are generated and 
transmitted by relocation agents, and how they might be internalised by populations 




As stated at the outset of this article, there is growing interest in helping poor and 
vulnerable communities cope with climate change by reframing population resettlement as 
an adaptation strategy. However, there is ongoing uncertainly surrounding the advantages 
and disadvantages of these kinds of interventions. This aim of this article was to help 
address this knowledge gap by considering what might be learned from state-led relocation 
programmes that have occurred in rural areas of African and Asian countries in the past few 
decades. The findings were grouped into three issues that should be taken into account 
when contemplating resettlement as adaptation: 1) government preference for state-led 
relocation over time and across various political regimes; 2) the challenges involved in 
distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary resettlement in practice; and 3) the added 
complications that the mobilisation of legitimising narratives present for achieving 
developmental relocations. These issues were then illustrated in the context of a recent 
state-led relocation programme in central Mozambique in order to draw out the operational 
implications for conducting resettlement as adaptation.  
 
Overall, the paper highlights the difficulties of introducing resettlement as adaptation into 
national contexts in which often complex displacement and relocation processes have 
helped to define state-rural relations over many years. Planned resettlement is sometimes 
portrayed in the climate change literature as a “novel, futuristic idea”, a phenomenon 
almost entirely arising in the context of weather-related shocks and stresses (see McAdam, 
2014;301). However, the approach adopted in this article suggests that we might be better 
informed about the future if we look towards the present and recent past. By exploring 
cases of state-led relocation in this manner, three key recommendations arise that should 
be taken into account by governments and aid agencies contemplating resettlement as 
adaptation interventions. First, there is need to uncover, and allow for, long-standing 
governmental perceptions of, and attitudes towards, rural populations, and the ways in 
which these potentially affect state-led responses to climate shocks and stresses. Second, in 
the context of climate variability and change, aid agencies and governments should develop 
a more sophisticated understanding of human choice, volition and self-determination during 
resettlement, and under what conditions these can be maintained, and whether they can 
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ever be justifiably broken. Third, greater attention should be paid to the narratives and 
messages concerning development that are generated and transmitted during relocation, 
how these might be internalised by relocatees during climate displacement and 
resettlement, and how they might affect population needs and expectations. Taking into 
account socioeconomic, political and historical realities in these ways will help to avoid 
situations in which present-day interventions to assist populations experiencing or 
threatened by climate displacement simply repeat or reinforce past injustices.  
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